

Atlantic Treaty Organization against the weapons and influenced government attitudes. The Soviet Union is defeated by U.S. technological might, and the Cold War ends without any recognition of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership role. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 is portrayed as a victory for high-tech weaponry, one that demonstrates the U.S. military's ability to adapt to a new way of fighting. Mahnken offers no discussion of the subsequent deterioration in security in Afghanistan, a development that resulted in a growing U.S. death toll after 2005, the deaths of many Afghan civilians, and fears that the United States would follow other countries in failing to pacify the country. Of course, no author writing about near-contemporaneous events can hope to foretell the future in detail, but fewer pages spent on listing the successive models of various aircraft and missiles in favor of a more nuanced discussion of the political context in which those weapons have been used would have improved his chances.

Mahnken's book invites comparison to an earlier work by Steven P. Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). Like Mahnken, Rosen takes military culture seriously, but he organizes his argument around a distinction between how militaries innovate in peacetime compared to what they do in wartime. Analyzing fewer cases in greater depth, Rosen argues that the military needs to learn to ask the right question—that is, to have a workable theory of victory—before it can make sensible decisions on technology and strategy. Rosen's work has influenced generations of graduate students and scholars, but it is barely recognized by Mahnken, who relies for most of his examples on a multitude of case studies generated in military educational institutions. An advantage of this approach is the wealth of detail told from the military perspective; a disadvantage is the lack of analytical depth. One substantial advantage of Mahnken's book, however, is its full treatment of the effects of nuclear weapons on the military services and on U.S. strategic thinking, a topic that Rosen explicitly eschews. That virtue, along with the book's even-handed treatment of interservice politics, makes *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945* a good choice for an undergraduate course in military technology or for anyone wanting to be reminded how far weapons technology has come since 1945.



Jamil Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011. 419 pp. \$72.00 cloth

Reviewed by Anar Valiyev and Natavan Aghayeva, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

The Ottoman and Russian empires had a long history of rivalry. From the mid-18th century to 1918 the two empires went to war with each other several times. No other country in Russia's neighborhood has fought Russia so many times. After World War I, when Ottoman Turkey and Tsarist Russia were on opposite sides, the two countries in their new incarnations became archrivals in the Black Sea region and Mediterra-

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nean. This new book by the well-known Azerbaijani historian Jamil Hasanli sheds valuable light on a key moment in the early post-1945 era that shaped the next 45 years of Soviet-Turkish relations. *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953* adduces a wealth of evidence to show the complicated nature of bilateral relations during World War II and afterward, highlighting the impact of personalities and other factors. The title of the book hints that Iosif Stalin was the main architect of the Turkish crisis of 1945–1953, the same way he was the initiator of the crisis across the perimeter of the Soviet border (the Azerbaijan/Iranian crisis in 1944–1948), the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949, and the Korean war of 1950–1953.

For decades, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the division of Europe after World War II were considered the main catalysts of Cold War. Hasanli goes against the flow and challenges the received wisdom about the early Cold War. He argues that the confrontation between the Allies over Iranian Azerbaijan and Turkey is what precipitated the Cold War, or in his terms “the war of nerves.” The particular value of Hasanli’s book is its rejection of a Europe-centric focus. He argues that “the wave of research on the Cold War in Europe brought by the euphoria of the 1990s upon collapse of the Soviet Union” (p. viii) has obscured the importance of the confrontation over Turkey.

In making his case, Hasanli draws on declassified archival documents from Moscow, Washington, and Ankara, including top-secret materials sent by the Soviet embassy in Ankara to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, regular reviews of the Turkish press with commentaries of embassy officials, secret instructions from Moscow to the Soviet embassy, and the Soviet Politburo’s decisions on Turkey. Further valuable materials used in the study are speeches and correspondence of heads of states, letters, and documents produced by diplomatic offices, military agencies, and intelligence services.

The book consists of an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion. It recounts the history of Soviet-Turkish relations during the interwar period, particularly the period 1939–1945. Chapter 2 deals with the “War of Nerves,” the political maneuvering and negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Hasanli argues that the Soviet Union was the main actor as it attempted to lodge territorial claims against Turkey and to set up a military base in the Straits. Although the main focus is on Ankara and Moscow, Hasanli also discusses the involvement of other interested parties, including the United States and Great Britain. George Kennan’s remark about Soviet policy toward Turkey—“I am sure that the Soviets will not temper their appetite for the Straits. On the contrary, they will take every chance to weaken the west’s influence on Turkey and establish friendly regime there” (p. 109)—neatly summarizes Soviet plans toward Turkey. Chapter 3 looks at Stalin’s policy toward Turkey. Hasanli shows the role of the Soviet republics of Armenia and to a lesser extent Georgia in ties with Turkey. He discusses Soviet preparations for annexing Turkish territories, the repatriation of Armenians from the Middle East to Armenia, and the deportation of Azerbaijani Turks from Armenia to Azerbaijan.

In chapter 4, Hasanli describes the domestic situation in Turkey and how the Soviet threat forced the Turkish establishment and people to incline toward the West and the United States in particular. Hasanli seeks to draw parallels between Soviet pol-

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icy toward Turkey and Soviet policy toward Iran. In the next chapter, he explains why Soviet territorial claims failed. Noting the support of the United States, he also stresses popular support in Turkey: “A united front against the Soviet threat brought together the people and the state, the government and the opposition, and contributed to improving the situation both inside and outside the country” (p. 245). Chapter 6 covers the internal politics of the republics of the South Caucasus and shows how Soviet policy toward Turkey affected domestic politics in the USSR’s southernmost republics. When hopes of adding territory to Soviet Armenia and Georgia at the expense of Turkey fell through, the leaders of Armenia and Georgia tried to lodge territorial claims against Azerbaijan, including Karabakh and other territories. Even though the leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, Mir-Jafar Bagirov, was able to reject such claims, he was unable to prevent the deportation of 130,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia to cotton-growing regions of Azerbaijan. Their houses were transferred to Armenians repatriated from the Middle East. The final two chapters show the evolution of Turkish policy, Turkey’s place in the Truman Doctrine, and Turkey’s accession to NATO.

Overall, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War-1953* is a marvelous addition to the literature on the early Cold War. Some readers may feel overwhelmed by too many historical facts and diplomatic correspondence that can tax their concentration, but most will find it a well-structured, detailed presentation that can be read with profit by scholars, students, and others interested in the Cold War’s origins.



Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2010. xiv, 334 pp. \$55.00.

Reviewed by Roger E. Kanet, University of Miami

Soon after Iosif Stalin’s death in 1953 the new Soviet leadership headed by Nikita S. Khrushchev revived Vladimir Lenin’s view that the interests of the USSR and those of the anticolonial forces throughout Asia and Africa coincided and that liberation groups challenging colonial power or in charge of newly independent states were likely allies in the struggle against the capitalist West. As one of the analysts in the West who for more than a quarter of a century attempted to track and understand the intricacies of the relationships between Moscow and the emerging governments and leaders of Africa and the Third World, I find Sergey Mazov’s *A Distant Front in the Cold War* to be a fascinating narrative, one that draws on documentary and archival materials that provide the detailed evidence concerning Soviet policy simply unavailable to analysts in the West—or in the Soviet Union itself—during the Cold War.

One surprising fact that emerges from a reading of Mazov’s excellent study is the degree to which earlier analysts generally “got it right”—with one major exception, as he points out, of generally assuming that Moscow had a comprehensive strategy in place and that its initiatives, even in the first decade of involvement in Africa, were

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